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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we discuss the choice and use of benchmarks in each of five areas 
relevant to an assessment of the progress of EU electricity sector liberalisation. These 
areas are market design, market power, EU enlargement, regulation, and 
sustainability. Our aim is to discuss the most important benchmarks for each area, 
and to do so in the context of that area. Where a benchmark can be used as a signal 
that things are going well (or badly) we will discuss the values associated with a good 
(or bad) signal. This paper forms part of the final report of the EU funded Sustainable 
Energy Specific Support Assessment project (SESSA, see www.sessa.eu.com).  
 
1 Introduction 
 
 
The aim of the SESSA research project from which this paper arises has been to 
identify good and bad practices affecting the electricity industry in the EU. 
Benchmarking is one way in which we can make comparisons across countries, and 
can contribute to that task. The European Commission has already begun this process, 
publishing four benchmarking reports over the past three years (European 
Commission, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005).  
 
The key to benchmarking is collecting comparable data from each country, and 
using to infer how well that country is performing. Three points immediately come to 
mind. First, it is important to collect information that actually sheds light upon the 
industry’s performance, rather than gathering data simply because it is available. 
Second, some types of data give useful information about the industry’s performance, 
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but cannot be used in themselves as indicators of good or bad practice. For example, 
population density in a country is important in explaining the level of transmission 
and distribution costs, but a country cannot be accused of good or bad practice on the 
basis of its population density! Third, even when the data is suitable to indicate how 
well an industry is likely to be performing, there may be exceptions, and so each case 
should always be the subject of further interpretation before final judgments are made. 
Benchmarks should be seen as signals rather than definitive indicators. The right 
choice of benchmarks, however, can minimise the number of times that a misleading 
signal is sent. 
 
In this paper, we discuss the choice and use of benchmarks in each of the five areas 
on which SESSA research has focussed. These areas are market design, market 
power, EU enlargement, regulation, and sustainability. It should be obvious that a 
number of benchmarks are relevant to more than one of these areas; however, our aim 
is to discuss the most important benchmarks for each area, and to do so in the context 
of that area. Where a benchmark can be used as a signal that things are going well (or 
badly) we will discuss the values associated with a good (or bad) signal.  
 
In some cases, our benchmarks have been included in the European Commission’s 
reports, but we also include suggestions of our own, where these can give additional 
useful information. Before moving on to benchmarks of good or bad practice, 
however, we list a few important pieces of information that can help put the overall 
performance of a country’s electricity industry in context. 
 
First, what is the level of electricity consumption, both in absolute terms and per 
capita? The greater the consumption, the easier it is to obtain economies of scale in 
production, and economies of density in distribution. 
 
Second, what primary energy sources does the country’s electricity industry use? A 
country with a high proportion of hydro-electricity may not be exposed to fluctuations 
in the prices of fossil fuels, but is vulnerable to years with low precipitation. 
Historically, oil prices have been more variable than coal prices, and so countries with 
a high proportion of oil-fired generation have seen greater changes in their input 
prices.  
 
2 Market Design 
 
When discussing market design, we are concerned with a mix of market rules and 
market structure. The former should be self-explanatory, but the latter has several 
dimensions. A full description of a market’s structure would include information on 
the number and relative sizes of the firms within each part of the market. Where part 
of the market is heavily concentrated, we might expect to have problems with market 
power. Since market power is itself the subject of the our next theme, benchmarks that 
are primarily concerned with horizontal market power are discussed in the next 
section of this paper.  
 The first question is how much of the market is open to competition. There can be 
a competitive wholesale market, even if no final consumers are able to choose their 
retailer, provided that enough retailers are competing to buy power from generators. 
The European Union’s policy, however, is to create competitive retail markets for 
electricity. Some Member States have already opened their entire markets to 
competition, while others have only opened part.1  
 
The natural benchmark to use, and the one used by the European Commission, is 
the proportion of consumption (in TWh) taken by customers who are allowed to 
choose their retailer. We believe that customers should only be included in the 
competitive part of the market if they can choose their retailer directly. Where there is 
a system of concessions, so that all consumers in an area must buy from the 
concessionaire, we would not count allowing the concessionaire to decide how to buy 
its power in the wholesale market as an instance of retail competition. The proportion 
of consumption in the competitive market gives a better indication of its economic 
importance than a benchmark based on customer numbers, since the largest customers 
are generally the first to be given this choice, and they are relatively small in number. 
The European Commission also publishes the thresholds at which consumers become 
eligible to join the competitive part of the market – these currently range from a 
consumption of 40 GWh a year to all non-household consumers (and of course, all 
consumers). These thresholds provide useful supplementary information, but the 
relationship between the threshold level and the proportion of the market open to 
competition is generally a straightforward one, and it is the latter that is the key 
indicator of good or bad practice.  
 
The European Commission signals that anything less than 100% market opening is 
undesirable, by shading these entries in red in its summary tables. Some economists, 
such as Newbery (2002) have questioned the benefits of giving household customers a 
choice of retailer, which would imply that the optimal level of market opening was 
rather lower (between 60% and 70%, depending on the national pattern of demand).  
We also note that the legal act of opening a market does not of itself ensure that 
customers can effectively exercise a choice, and that there are some markets which 
have had little customer switching, despite being legally 100% open for several years 
– a matter which we benchmark in the next section.  Legal market opening is a 
necessary, rather than a sufficient, condition for liberalisation. 
 
It is generally accepted that competition in an electricity industry can be greatly 
weakened if the transmission operator also has interests in generation, and is in a 
position to favour them in its operating decisions. The second European Directive on 
electricity liberalisation therefore required that there should be vertical separation 
between transmission and the rest of the industry, and between distribution and the 
rest of the industry, except for networks with fewer than 100,000 customers. Our 
benchmark, which is reported by the European Commission, is whether this vertical 
separation has been adopted, and the type of separation used. The Commission reports 
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list four levels of separation: Ownership separation, legal separation, management 
separation, and accounting separation. In a few cases, it also reports distribution 
networks that have not been separated from other activities in the industry. 
Accounting separation is the weakest form, in which a company keeps accounts for its 
network and for its competitive activities, and must charge the competitive businesses 
the same fees for using the network as it charges third parties. This is intended to 
prevent cross-subsidies between the network and the competitive activities. 
Management separation requires that different people are responsible for the network 
business and the competitive activities, and that the network business cannot pass on 
information about rival concerns. Legal separation goes further, with a completely 
separate legal entity to run the network. Even in this case, however, staff working for 
the network business will be aware of the financial interests of their parent 
organisation and its competitive activities, and may take decisions to further these. 
Only full ownership separation, when the network is an independent organisation 
rather than a subsidiary, can completely remove the incentive to favour one market 
participant over others.  
 
The Commission signals that ownership separation and legal separation provide the 
best conditions for effective competition, and shades any other positions in red as a 
warning sign that competition may be impeded. In the case of transmission, we agree 
unreservedly with this assessment. Distribution networks are generally managed in a 
passive manner, allowing electricity to flow from the transmission network to the 
consumers with little intervention from the system operator. In this case, the operator 
has little scope to discriminate between network users in physical terms. The access 
charges for the network will need to be regulated, and it is harder to regulate a 
company that is active in several segments of the industry than one that is specialised 
in distribution alone – there are opportunities for it to shift costs from a competitive 
segment of the business into the regulated activity. There may be branding advantages 
to a retailing business that also operates the local network. We thus agree that 
competition will be more effective, the greater the degree of separation. However, we 
believe that incomplete separation will do less damage in the case of distribution 
networks than in the case of transmission.  
 
Effective competition also requires a well-functioning wholesale market. Newbery 
(2005) has demonstrated how important the details of market design can be, but it is 
still useful to list broad categories of market institutions. The European Commission 
lists three main categories of wholesale market – those based upon bilateral trading 
(the majority), those using a Pool and contracts for differences (Ireland, Lithuania and 
Spain), and those with a hybrid model (the Nordic countries). Newbery (2005) 
suggested that a Pool (or hybrid) model had significant advantages in providing a 
transparent reference price, as long as the market was not so concentrated that the 
transparency enhanced positions of market power. 
 
Balancing arrangements are also very important – in the end, arbitrage against the 
final stage of the market (or the possibility of accepting an imbalance between a 
company’s contracted and physical positions) will affect the whole structure of market 
prices. The European Commission lists three main ways in which balancing charges 
are set – through a market, by the regulator, and by the transmission system operator. 
The three two-way combinations of these options also appear in table 1. 
 
We believe that market-based balancing is likely to produce the best results, at 
least as long as the market is sufficiently competitive. If the market is concentrated, 
then incumbent generators may be able to manipulate it, damaging entrants. This 
would be made worse if the transmission system operator is still linked to those 
generators. Charges set by a transmission system operator are likely to be second-best, 
while the regulator is unlikely to have the information to set charges that reflect the 
rapidly changing conditions on an electricity system. While we repeat the importance 
of drawing conclusions only after investigation, we would expect that balancing 
charges set by a regulator would be an example of bad practice.  
 
To create a truly integrated European market for electricity, companies must not 
face artificial barriers in sending power across national borders. At the same time, the 
capacity on many cross-border inter-connectors is less than the demand for it for a 
significant part of the year. The question then is how that scarce capacity is allocated 
among users. On the grounds of economic efficiency, the best methods are to have an 
explicit auction, or to adopt the market-splitting used in Nord Pool, where a single 
market covers both sides of a cross-border inter-connector. Many inter-connectors 
within Europe, however, are allocated according to past use, which does not guarantee 
that those with the greatest value for the inter-connector will use it, or by scaling 
down the requests for capacity to meet the available capacity, which can encourage 
gaming when making those requests. We suggest that the method of allocating inter-
connector capacity is suitable for benchmarking. Since most countries in Europe have 
inter-connectors with several other countries, a possible summary statistic would be 
the proportion of their inter-connector capacity that is managed by explicit auctions or 
by market-splitting.  
 
All of these benchmarks have reflected the way in which the market is organised. 
We will propose one benchmark that reflects the way in which it is performing. This 
is the level of liquidity in the wholesale market, looking separately at the day-ahead 
market (or other market operating close to real time) and the forward markets. In a 
liquid market, agents can make reasonably large transactions without affecting the 
market price too greatly, whereas it can be very difficult to find a counter-party in an 
illiquid market. Liquidity in forward markets can also reflect market participants’ 
view of how well the underlying spot market is performing. The very high liquidity in 
the Nordic forward markets shows that traders view Nord Pool as a well-functioning 
market which is unlikely to create losses by posting inexplicable prices. In contrast, 
the British regulator argued that the low level of forward trading around the Pool in 
England and Wales showed a lack of confidence in that market’s price formation 
process.2  
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In general, the more liquid a market is, the better. No electricity market has 
reached the stage that the transaction costs of repeated trading have outweighed the 
benefits of better price discovery. Liquidity in day-ahead markets will naturally be 
lower than in the forward markets, since the main purpose of these markets is to allow 
generators and retailers to adjust positions that they have already reached in earlier 
trading. (The exception is where a gross Pool is used to schedule plants at the day-
ahead stage, as in Spain). There is no “bright line” between a market with sufficient 
liquidity and one that is too illiquid to allow traders to adjust their positions easily, but 
spot markets with a turnover of less than ten per cent of demand, or forward markets 
with a turnover of less than three times demand, are likely to be undesirably illiquid. 
 
3 Market Power 
 
The second theme concerned market power. Many academic papers on firm 
behaviour have been written in what is known as the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm. The structure of the market, including such features as the number of firms 
and the type of product they are selling, affects the way in which they act (their 
conduct) and the market outcomes, such as prices (its performance). While more 
recent work recognises that firms make strategic decisions that affect the structure of 
the market, it is useful to think of benchmarks in this area as those related to structure 
and those related to performance. 
 
The potential for market power is clearly related to market shares. We should stress 
that this potential may be ameliorated by, for example, competition from imports, and 
that the possession of a dominant position does not necessarily mean that it will be 
abused. The Commission’s benchmarking reports list the market shares of the largest 
generator, measured by capacity, and of the three largest generators taken together. 
These are easily understandable measures, and since the Commission includes the 
potential import capacity in each national total, the measures take account of the 
reduction in domestic market power that comes from foreign competition. While 
higher levels of concentration increase the likelihood of problems, there is no clear 
dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable levels. The Commission gives a 
red warning signal to single firm market shares of more than 40%, and three-firm 
shares of more than 70%. Markets where the largest firm had less than 20% of 
capacity, and the three largest less than 40%, are given a green signal of health. While 
unconcentrated markets are less likely to suffer from problems of market power, it is 
worth noting that the three largest firms in California owned just 30% of the capacity 
in the state at the time of that State’s electricity crisis, and that the five firms most 
often accused of exercising market power owned no more than 32%.3  
 
An alternative to these concentration ratios would be the Herfindahl Hirschman 
Index (HHI), which takes the share of each generator in turn, squares it, and then 
sums the squares. The index takes a value of 10,000 where there is a monopoly, 5,000 
where there are two equally sized firms, and falls towards zero as the market becomes 
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less and less concentrated. It has the advantage that it is potentially affected by the 
size of every firm in the market, whereas two markets with the same concentration 
ratio could behave differently because of the size distribution of firms outside the top 
group. One disadvantage of applying the HHI to shares of capacity in European 
electricity markets is that it is not obvious how to treat interconnector capacity. 
Treating each interconnector as a single firm might actually raise the measured 
concentration in a small, well-connected, market, and this would be inappropriate if 
the neighbouring markets were competitive. It might be best to divide each 
interconnector’s capacity according to the capacity shares (excluding imports) in the 
neighbouring markets. As to the level of this benchmark to aim for, the European 
Commission’s Merger Guidelines state that “the Commission is unlikely to identify 
horizontal competition concerns” if the post-merger HHI is below 1,000; increased by 
less than 150 as a result of a merger, or increased by less than 250 when the post-
merger HHI is between 1,000 and 2,000 (the equivalent of five equal-sized firms).4
 
As an alternative to measures based on shares of capacity, we could calculate 
shares of output. Energy-limited generators, such as hydroelectric plants, or 
intermittent sources, such as wind farms, may have less influence on the market than 
their shares of capacity would imply. Base-load generators which run continuously 
will have relatively more impact on an output-based measure of concentration than a 
capacity-based measure. Since a firm’s financial incentive to raise prices is generally 
directly proportional to the output it is producing, this might imply that the output-
based measures are a better indicator of firms’ incentives to exercise market power. 
Most electricity markets have few problems of market power when demand levels are 
low, however, even including the notorious case of California (Borenstein et al, 
2002). Market power in generation is most likely to be a problem at times of high 
demand. At these times, however, most capacity will be in use, and so the capacity-
based measures give a better impression of the state of the market than output-based 
measures. We therefore support the use of capacity-based measures in generation. 
 
One disadvantage of the measures discussed so far is that the relationship between 
concentration and prices in electricity markets is a complex one. Various specialised 
indicators are used by electricity market monitors, particularly in the United States, to 
give a better signal of when a market may be vulnerable to the exercise of market 
power. For example, the pivotal supply index can be defined as the proportion of 
hours during which any supplier in the market is pivotal – that is, that demand could 
not be met without some output from that supplier’s plants. In the absence of effective 
demand side response, the supplier could (in theory) ask for almost any price it 
wanted at such times. Another indicator is the residual supply index.  Calculated for a 
given company in a given hour, it is the ratio of the total capacity owned by all the 
other companies in the market to the level of demand in that hour.  A figure of 110% 
or less implies that the company is nearly pivotal, and may have scope to raise prices.  
The proportion of hours in which the residual supply index for the largest company 
was above 110% could be used as a summary benchmark to allow cross-country 
comparisons.  Other specialised measures are discussed by Twomey et al. (2005).  
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 In the retail sector, the Commission collects information on the market share of the 
largest company, and the largest three companies, in terms of sales in TWh. Once 
again, these are intuitive measures, easily related to the potential for market power, 
and relatively easy to collect. The Commission’s figures are collected and calculated 
on a national basis, however, which might be inappropriate. The problem is that 
competition to sell electricity to households has a strong regional (or local) basis, and 
that the incumbent former monopolist in each area generally has a high market share. 
The incumbent may well have market power within its area, but when we aggregate 
across areas with different incumbents, the market will look much less concentrated.  
 
As an example, in December 2003, British Gas had a 24% market share among 
household electricity consumers in Great Britain, PowerGen had a share of 21%, and 
National Power a share of 15%. The three-firm concentration ratio was thus 60% (in 
this part of the market). Within any area, however, the incumbent electricity company 
alone had an average share of 59%, implying a three-firm concentration ratio of 
nearly 90%. Competition to supply non-household consumers is more national in 
scope, which will dilute this effect when data for the entire market are collected. Note 
that collecting data on a regional basis, computing the concentration ratios, and then 
taking their average will have little impact on the values obtained when competition is 
truly national, since market shares in each region should be similar. For this reason, 
we recommend that data should be collected and concentration ratios calculated on a 
regional basis, but taking national averages to present the results.  
 
The level of vertical integration is an important structural feature of a market. If 
there is a lot of vertical integration between generators and retailers, then it can be 
difficult for non-integrated entrants to break into the industry. This in turn helps the 
incumbents to keep prices high. We suggest that data should be collected on the 
proportion of electricity that is retailed by a company in the same corporate group as 
the company that generated it. This would then be an indicator of the level of vertical 
integration. High levels of integration are unlikely to be consistent with best practice 
unless both generation and retailing are unconcentrated, in which case entrant 
companies should face many options for obtaining, or selling, power. 
 
When it comes to the performance of an electricity industry, we would like to 
discuss two measures. First, what about the level of wholesale prices? The absolute 
level of wholesale prices is relatively uninformative, since costs can vary significantly 
over time and across markets. It is better to relate wholesale prices to the marginal 
cost of generation. In a competitive market with spare capacity (at a particular point in 
time), competition should drive prices down to the level of marginal cost, whereas 
prices significantly above marginal cost would be an indicator of market power. At 
peak times, however, when there is little or no spare capacity, marginal cost is hard to 
define, and prices should certainly rise above marginal operating costs, or generators 
will be unable to recover their fixed costs. A possible measure of performance is thus 
to compare prices with calculated marginal costs, but taking only those periods in 
which capacity exceeds demand by a specified margin.  If this margin is too small, 
however, scarcity rents will be interpreted as the result of market power, whereas if 
the margin is too high, some potentially high-priced hours, in which market power 
might be exercised despite the presence of a small amount of spare capacity, might be 
excluded. 
 
The standard way in which this comparison is presented is the Lerner index, which 
is equal to (price minus marginal cost) divided by price. A Lerner index of close to 
zero is a sign of a competitive market, whereas the Lerner index in California 
exceeded 0.5 in many hours during the summer of 2000. 
 
The disadvantages of this measure include the significant effort required to 
calculate it. Although simple models of the industry can be built and maintained at 
low cost, and regularly updated with fuel prices and demand levels to calculate new 
figures for marginal costs, these models typically ignore many of the operating 
constraints that the real system faces. These constraints force the system operators to 
run expensive but flexible plants in place of cheaper, inflexible, generators, and 
thereby increase marginal costs. Models which do not take such constraints into 
account are likely to over-estimate the level of the Lerner index.  Bergman (2005) 
gives a much fuller account of these problems, and shows how serious they may be in 
practice.  This paper also discusses the tension between the regulator’s comparison of 
prices with short-run marginal costs (often fuel alone) and the company’s need to 
recover all of its costs.  The tension can only be resolved by allowing peak prices to 
rise above short-run variable costs. 
 
Furthermore, if an official body regularly estimated the level of marginal (or 
average) costs, and compared out-turn prices to its estimate, this would surely affect 
the development of the market. If prices were found to be regularly above the level of 
marginal costs, there could well be calls for action that would reduce them. 
Generators might decide to keep prices close to their prediction of the official estimate 
of marginal costs. The outcome would be a very unusual market, to say the least. For 
this reason, it is probably better to think of the Lerner index as a measure that could 
be calculated from time to time to give a “snapshot” picture of market performance, 
than as a benchmark to be collected on a regular basis.  It might be possible to 
measure the index for all the hours in a sample period, and then to check whether 
instances of a very high index could be explained by (legitimate) capacity shortages.  
 
Our second performance measure concerns the retail market. It is possible to 
measure the number of customers (or share of consumption) switching between 
retailers, either over the whole period since the start of competition, or over a more 
recent period, such as the last year. Measuring the total number of customers who 
have switched at least once implicitly tells us how many customers are still with the 
incumbent ex-monopolist, and may signal something about that company’s market 
power. Measuring the total number of switches over a long period does not tell us 
whether a small number of customers are switching frequently, or many customers are 
switching, but only infrequently, and is therefore a bad measure of the state of 
competition. At least once the market has been open for a few years, the best 
benchmark will be the number of consumers who have switched in the past year. 
 This measure does need to be interpreted with care, however. We could conceive 
of a really competitive market in which it was easy for customers to switch between 
firms, and the fear of losing customers would force every firm to offer a very good 
price and a high standard of service. As long as they did so, customers would not need 
to switch, and so we would observe very little switching. At the other extreme, if 
switching is sufficiently difficult, customers might stay with their existing retailer 
despite high prices and poor service. It is not obvious that we could tell these markets 
apart, purely on the basis of the observed switching rates. In practice, however, there 
is some differentiation between companies, in terms of tariff design or fringe benefits 
(several British companies sell electricity with reward points – such as Air Miles –  
attached), giving customers positive reasons to switch between companies. In these 
circumstances, low levels of switching are likely to reflect barriers to doing so, and to 
be an indicator of bad practice. 
 
 
4 Regulation 
 
The fourth theme concerned regulation. By regulation we mean the sector specific 
economic regulation that governs the electricity sector. Such regulation normally 
involves the promotion of competition in the generation sector and the setting of 
network tariffs for transmission and distribution. Benchmarking regulation is very 
difficult because it is not that easy to know what aspect of regulation to benchmark. 
Regulation of private or mixed ownership systems is a necessary evil which is 
required when the normal processes of competition cannot be left to take their course. 
Thus a well functioning electricity market should consist of a minimal amount of 
regulatory intervention combined with the utilisation of market or private decision 
making wherever possible. The more favourable the market conditions and initial 
endowments the less need for regulation there is. Relatively small electricity markets 
dominated by nuclear or hydro power should require proportionately more regulatory 
intervention than larger markets dominated by gas or coal power.  
 
In seeking to characterise the lessons from the European experience of regulation 
we look at three aspects of electricity regulation: the form of regulation, the process of 
regulation and the outcome of regulation. The form of regulation concerns the how 
regulation is organised (e.g. via an independent sector specific regulatory agency). 
The process of regulation is to do with the way that the regulation is actually 
conducted (e.g. RPI-X price control of electricity distribution with X set using 
comparative benchmarking). The outcome of regulation is to do with an overall 
assessment of the contribution of regulation to the performance of the industry (e.g. 
the impact of price controls on regulated prices). 
 
4.1  The form of regulation 
The 2003 Electricity Directive discusses electricity regulation in some detail 
(Article 23 on Regulatory Authorities). Each country is required to set up an 
independent regulatory agency (or agencies) responsible for ‘ensuring non-
discrimination, effective competition and the efficient functioning of the market.’ (L 
176/49) 
 
There seems to be empirical support for the idea that electricity market reform 
requires an effective independent regulatory system (Bergara et al., 1998). An 
independent sector specific regulatory agency is seen to be part of this regulatory 
system. Independence itself is not enough. This would need to be combined with the 
regulator having power over the key elements of electricity regulation to promote an 
effective market. These include the power to: set network access conditions (and thus 
not to arbitrarily deny market access to new competitors); resolve disputes between 
parties (particularly between generators and network companies); determine regulated 
prices in advance (thus providing clearer incentives to regulated firms and reducing 
the scope for lobbying); and acquire relevant information from companies. The 2003 
Electricity Directive does not discuss the methodologies that should be employed in 
regulation. 
 
There is a continuing debate about how heads of regulatory agencies or 
commissioners should be selected. The formal literature from the US seems to suggest 
that elected regulators are to be preferred in that they achieve lower prices (Besley 
and Coate, 2003) and keep the costs of regulation down (Mixon, 2001). However in 
other jurisdictions the situation is not so clear cut. In developing countries elected 
regulators may just represent different interests rather than being independent (see 
Estache and Martimort, 1999). In mature democracies with little tradition of direct 
election to specialist jobs (such as most countries in Europe) election does not seem 
appropriate. However it clearly is important to appoint individuals without clear 
conflicts of interest and to protect them from arbitrary political interference. This can 
be done by limiting the conditions under which they can be dismissed and fixing their 
term of office. 
 
In Table 4 in the annex, under Strength of regulator, we score each country on 
whether they have ex ante regulation (= 1, ex post = 0), ministerial involvement (1 = 
no, 0.5 = some, 0 = yes), network access conditions set by the regulator (1 = yes, 0 = 
no), dispute settlement by the regulator (1= yes, 0 = no) and strong information 
acquisition powers (1 = yes, 0 = no). 
 
The table suggests that in 2003, these strong conditions were met in only 7 
countries. Germany continued to have no regulatory agency until mid July 2005, 
when the Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Posts 
and Railway (Bundesnetzagentur) was established. Until then the oversight of the 
electricity sector was in the hands of the German Competition Authority (the 
Bundeskartellamt). 
 
As part of the SESSA research programme Larsen et al. (2005) conducted a 
detailed survey of European electricity regulators to review their responsibilities and 
organisation. They found that there was a significant variation in the objectives of 
independent regulatory agencies. Of the 15 they examined, 14 had the promotion of 
competition as one of their legislative objectives, however only 6 had socially 
responsible prices as an objective. Indeed the total number of objectives varied 
between 7 for Ireland and 1 for Sweden. 
 
Larsen et al. also showed that most heads of the regulatory agency had 4-6 year 
terms, could not be sacked for matters related to policy, and could not hold offices in 
government. Regulatory agencies are mainly funded by fees levied on regulated firms, 
have control of their own expenditure within their budget limit, and personnel 
appointments. It is supposed that regulatory agencies which do not rely on 
government for their income and are not restricted to civil service pay scales for staff 
have the capacity to act more independently of government (see Domah, Pollitt and 
Stern, 2002). However Larsen et al. find that in Europe there is a wide variety in who 
appoints the head of the agency with only 4 countries having the head appointed by 
legislature and the executive and 5 countries, including the UK, making the 
appointment by one or two ministers. Some countries do not allow an industry figure 
to be head of their agency (e.g. Austria). In terms of which competencies a regulator 
had freedom to exercise, Larsen et al. found that only Ireland and Norway were fully 
competent in tariff setting, network access terms, issuing of licences, setting terms of 
delivery, settling disputes and enforcement (see Table 4). The UK, Italy and the 
Netherlands were fully competent in five out of the six areas and partially competent 
in a sixth area. 
 
We suggest the following indicators of the form of regulation: Functions of 
regulatory agency and degree of freedom over these, tenure and terms of appointment 
of head of regulatory agency, how the regulatory agency is financed (eg. Industry levy 
or by taxpayer) and salary scales of staff (i.e. civil service or independent). 
 
4.2  The process of regulation 
Regulatory agencies must carry out their work competently and use state of the art 
methods. They should demonstrate a willingness to be transparent and a process of 
appropriate stakeholder engagement in the course of decision making. This is 
important for two reasons. First, transparency is important for the democratic 
legitimacy of any regulatory agency that operates at arms length from political 
control. Second, transparency and stakeholder engagement should lead to better 
regulatory decision making as regulators can benefit from the informed comment 
which stakeholders and independent observers can make on their decision making 
processes. 
 
Casual observation of European regulators reveals wide differences in the degree 
of transparency between regulators. Ofgem in the UK and NVE in Norway have 
comprehensive information available on their website and readily respond to requests 
for information and regulatory data. By contrast CRE in France do not publish much 
material (for example with respect to the performance of the distribution departments 
of EdF) and E-Control in Austria is not allowed by law to publish certain types of data 
on the performance of regulated companies that is readily available in the UK and 
Norway.  
 
An efficient process of regulation involves procedural efficiency on the part of 
regulators with timely reporting and a pro-active agenda. Ofgem publish regular work 
plans and issue consultation reports on issues such as how to set prices on the 
distribution network to encourage embedded generation. For their regular price 
reviews of electricity distribution and transmission charges they adhere to well 
worked out 18 month work plans which deliver final proposals 4-5 months prior to the 
start of a new price control review period (see Pollitt, 2005). By contrast, other 
countries have had serious procedural efficiency problems. For instance the 
Netherlands first electricity distribution price control review, undertaken by the DTe, 
was only completed more than two and a half years after the initial deadline and only 
just ahead of the subsequent price control review period (see Nillesen and Pollitt, 
2004). 
 
Systematically comparing the process of regulation in different European countries 
requires some objective measure of what a good regulatory process would look like. 
The work of Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) provides some information on this with respect 
to transmission and distribution price reviews. For a sample of 18 OECD countries, of 
which 14 were in Europe, they examined the use of benchmarking methods. They 
identified 6 countries that could be thought of as leading countries who were using 
sophisticated benchmarking techniques (such as data envelopment analysis) – Chile, 
UK, Norway, Netherlands, US (California) and Australia (New South Wales). All but 
California also employed ex ante regulation (in the sense of not adjusting regulated 
prices and revenues in the light of outturn costs, as for example is the case in rate of 
return regulation). Most also had a process of consultation and incentivised supply 
quality of service and investments. These countries also published information on the 
web and were open to third-party studies of benchmarking. This study strongly 
suggests that where it is possible to specify what a good process of regulation might 
look like it is possible to identify countries which practice such a process. Fillipini et 
al. (2005) provided updated information on the use of benchmarking methods by 
European regulators and showed that the UK, Norway and the Netherlands have 
continued to provide the lead in their process of regulation. 
 
Reviews of regulatory decision making are important in capturing the lessons from 
review processes and holding independent regulatory agencies accountable for the 
process of regulation. These reviews are particularly appropriate following major 
regulatory decision making processes such as the introduction of new trading 
arrangements or the completion of a network price review. Importantly they offer 
opportunities for stakeholders to formally feedback on the performance and decision-
making processes behind regulatory decisions. These reviews can be conducted by the 
regulator itself, parliamentary committees, public spending watchdogs, or expert 
panels. The UK’s regulator, Ofgem, consulted stakeholders on the process of its 2004 
distribution price control review (Ofgem, 2005), while the UK’s National Audit 
Office (2002) questioned the cost of RPI-X regulation that involved demanding large 
amounts of information from companies which were not subsequently used. However 
to our knowledge no EU regulator has conducted independent expert reviews of 
electricity price control processes such as is the norm in the UK water industry (see 
for example Independent Steering Group, 2005). We would suggest that independent 
ex post reviews should be the norm for major packages of work carried out by 
regulators. 
 
Leading European regulators are increasingly co-operating on matters of mutual 
interest (often via the Council of European Energy Regulators or CEER). This is 
imperative in the area of electricity transmission where almost all countries have too 
few domestic comparators to make a meaningful assessment of the scope for cost 
savings and hence X factors. This issue is becoming more important in the area of 
electricity distribution, where initial conditions and mergers have begun to reduce the 
number of effective comparator firms. Co-operation is required to standardise 
definitions and data collection and to share lessons from the use of different methods. 
It is interesting to observe that the same group of countries is frequently seen to be 
taking the lead in the area of co-operation: the UK and Scandinavia. This contrasts 
with the absence of France, Germany and Spain from many of these discussions.  
 
We suggest the following indicators of process efficiency: all documents are 
routinely published on the regulator’s website (Y/N), whether important documents 
are additionally available in English for non-English speaking regulatory agencies 
(Y/N), the presence of a work plan on the website (Y/N), whether targets for work 
delivered are routinely met in a timely way (Y/N), whether use is made of external 
advice (Y/N), which benchmarking methods are used, whether regulator’s action are 
ex post assessed (never, randomly, routinely), whether the country is an active 
member of the CEER by serving on one of its working groups (Y/N) and the number 
of named CEER collaborations it has been involved with. 
 
On the above criteria both the UK and Norwegian regulators score very highly. 
The UK’s Ofgem scores yes/routinely to all of the above. Both these agencies have 
the longest and most consistent experience in Europe with electricity reform and seem 
to provide the most obvious role models for other European countries. 
 
4.3  The outcome of regulation 
Measuring the performance of a regulatory agency in terms of outcomes which are 
valued by society is complicated by an identification problem. Regulation is just one 
factor explaining the performance of an electricity sector. Regulation may be 
implemented at exactly the same time as restructuring or privatisation, making it 
difficult to access its unique impact. The strength of initial legislation or general 
competition policy may also be important factors behind the success of regulatory 
processes.  
In developing countries the measurement of performance can be measured by the 
general health of the electricity sector. This can be easily gauged by the size of system 
losses, shortages of capacity and the amount of investment in the sector. All of these 
we would expect to see strongly correlated with the exact timing of reform. For 
developed countries these indicators become difficult to interpret. For example 
increased efficiency may mean less investment for a fully developed electricity 
network.  
 
It is possible to conduct cost benefit analyses of individual pieces of regulation. For 
major discrete changes in market design or regulatory process may lend themselves to 
this sort of analysis. A good example of this is Green and McDaniel (1998) which 
looks at the impact of the introduction of full retail competition in the UK. They 
found that the benefits in terms of lower prices and improved induced efficiency 
barely matched the considerable implementation cost in terms of new information 
technology aimed at facilitating residential customer switching. This analysis 
suggested that at the very least a cheaper IT system, which the regulator failed to 
deliver, would have been necessary to deliver unambiguous benefits to society. In a 
subsequent study Evans and Green (2003) found that the introduction of the new 
electricity trading arrangements (NETA) which replaced the power pool in England 
and Wales may not have delivered lower prices of wholesale energy in spite of 
costing at least £1bn to implement. The effect of this decision was masked by the fact 
that regulator-initiated changes in generation market structure took effect around the 
same time.  
 
The 2001 – 2003 electricity distribution price review in the Netherlands provides a 
further example of how ex post assessment of regulatory outcomes may be possible. 
Nillesen and Pollitt (2004) report that the X factors were revised three times and 
implemented almost 3 years late, with the final X factors delivering around 200m 
Euros less benefit to consumers than might otherwise have been the case. This 
example of regulatory failure to deliver was a much the fault of the original badly 
drafted legislation as it was the fault of the badly managed process of regulation. The 
combination of these two unfortunate factors led to quantifiable losses for electricity 
consumers. It was also partly responsible for the need for the Dutch parliament to pass 
subsequent legislation strengthening the powers of the regulator and correcting the 
previous ambiguous drafting of the legislation. 
 
Ideally, we would like to do an efficiency assessment of regulatory agencies in 
order to judge their performance. Cost of regulation would be the input to the 
efficiency analysis. Sector performance controlling for size and complexity of the task 
would be the outputs. Domah and Pollitt (2002) have gone some way towards this by 
calculating the efficiency scores of a sample of 33 regulators in developed countries 
using cost as an input and measures of system size and complexity (such as electricity 
sales and number of firms) as outputs. They found that the Swedish regulator 
performed very well on this measure due to its very low costs per customer (see also 
the final column of Table 4). 
 
 It is interesting to note that recently Ofgem subjected itself to a revenue cap of 
RPI-3 for 5 years from 2005-2010. Such an approach has the merit of limiting 
potentially damaging and expensive regulation but does obscure the point that direct 
regulatory costs are usually small in relation to total electricity revenue and that the 
benefits of small increases in regulatory expenditure in terms of improved social 
welfare can be very large. Thus it may be that unmeasurable benefits and unmeasured 
external costs may drive an accurate social cost benefit analysis of regulation. 
 
Indicators suggested for the outcome of regulation: the performance in social cost 
benefit analysis of regulation, the size of X factors and savings from price control 
reviews, the cost of the regulatory agency per customer, the trend in electricity price 
relative to European average since beginning of reforms and the presence of 
incentives on regulator to be efficient. 
 
4.4  Conclusions 
There is widespread agreement that independent regulation aimed at promoting 
competition in generation and supply markets while providing for incentive based 
regulation of transmission and distribution tariffs is the best form of economic 
regulation of electricity markets. Best practice processes of regulation are those which 
involve transparency and effective engagement with stakeholders. Such processes 
must involve learning from the successes and failures of other regulatory jurisdictions. 
This is particularly true for technical issues such as how to set network prices for 
embedded generation or how to benchmark network utilities. The overall outcome of 
regulation is difficult to measure, but the success or otherwise of major regulatory 
decisions should be quantified using social cost benefit analysis. There also seems to 
be further work that is possible on trying to develop good measures of the 
performance of regulators over time. 
 
It remains interesting to observe that while the principles of good regulation in the 
electricity sector are increasingly well established, the speed of their implementation 
across Europe is strongly correlated with the strength of general competition policy 
and a pro-competitive government policy. It is also the case that good regulatory 
outcomes are facilitated by the comprehensiveness of initial market structure reforms 
in the sector, such as horizontal and vertical unbundling (compare the strength of 
regulator score (and to a lesser extent the competencies of the regulator score) in 
Table 4 to the indicators of market structure in Tables 1 and 2). Thus it is that Norway 
and the UK that continue to lead in the practice of regulation with scores of 5 out of 5 
on strength of regulator, while having among the most competitive and vertically dis-
integrated electricity sectors in Europe. 
 
5 EU Enlargement 
 
Eastern European countries are physically integrated with the west European grid, 
and took the first steps towards adopting the “western model” with regulated third 
party access for the larger customers, partial privatisation of companies within the 
industry (except in Slovenia) and reducing barriers to international trade. But like in 
the rest of Europe, each reform is unfinished regarding its market design and the 
existing market power let to the dominant player. One specific problem of EU 
enlargement is of course the rather underdeveloped academic & empirical studies 
regarding these countries. In EU 15 countries, information, indicators and data have 
existed for years and are easily available. Such development in monitoring is just 
starting for many of the new Member States and candidate countries. 
 
Some of the challenges faced by the New Member States are common to other 
countries in Europe, and can be assessed through the benchmarks we propose in other 
sections of this report. In particular, many Eastern countries have surplus capacity at 
present, which will be picked up by benchmarks for security of supply, and have a 
fuel mix that is heavily weighted towards coal, which will be picked up by 
benchmarks on carbon emissions. The limited penetration of renewable generators, 
and dependence on feed-in tariffs for support, is also shown in the benchmarks for 
sustainable investment, in the next section. Many countries have dominant companies, 
and their influence can be picked up in the benchmarks on market power. Wholesale 
markets are typically embryonic, with low liquidity, as shown in the benchmarks for 
market design. 
 
In this section, therefore, we concentrate on features of the electricity market that 
are more prevalent in the New Member States than other EU countries, even though 
they are not unique. One of these is the distorted price structure that a number of 
Eastern countries retain. This is generally the legacy of a system in which domestic 
consumption of electricity was subsidised at the expense of industrial and commercial 
consumption. This can be benchmarked by taking the ratio of a specified domestic 
price (or prices) to an industrial price. In Table 3, we take the ratio of the Eurostat 
price for domestic customers (Eurostat type DC) to the average of the price for 
industrial customers (Eurostat types IB and IC). The higher cost of serving domestic 
customers implies that this should almost certainly be greater than one, although the 
level that would accurately reflect the relative costs will vary from country to country. 
Countries with very low levels are almost certainly suffering from distorted tariffs. 
 
Some countries may still have tariffs that do not allow producers to recover their 
costs. This might be benchmarked by taking the ratio of revenues to costs, although it 
will be important to measure those costs in a consistent manner. It would not be 
appropriate to use the replacement cost of assets if they have been privatised for a 
much lower value, as this would imply that the new owners should receive a windfall 
profit. Using the sale value, however, can justify the present level of prices, since 
investors will have based their decision of how much to pay for the assets on their 
predictions of future profits, which are linked to the level of prices. It is also unclear 
whether the replacement value should be used for companies that have not yet been 
privatised – this might show that state-owned companies were under-recovering, 
while private companies with similar prices were performing well. It is clear that the 
appropriate level of prices is a difficult subject to benchmark. 
 
In a number of countries, companies were awarded long-term contracts to sell 
generation, or to use cross-border transmission lines, without meaningful competition. 
In some cases, long-term contracts were used to help finance traditional fuel suppliers 
(mainly coal mining) and environmental improvements, before creating competitive 
electricity markets; in other cases, long term contracts can be seen as a “quasi 
integration device”. In Eastern countries the two situations seem to coexist: many 
international transmission lines are congested at the present5 time, and there are a 
large number of long-term contracts that take up much of the potentially available 
capacity and reduce the impact of market opening. The other category of long-term 
contracts concerns generation. Now that there are attempts to increase competition, 
and long-term contracts that guarantee part of the market are likely to impede entry 
and give advantages to incumbent generators. This is not to suggest that all long-term 
contracts are bad, for competitively awarded contracts can be useful in financing new 
entry. If it is possible to isolate contracts awarded without competition, however, then 
we could establish benchmarks for these. We suggest that the proportion of cross-
border capacity allocated through long-term contracts awarded without competition 
could be one benchmark, and the proportion of generation sold through long-term 
contracts awarded without competition could be another.  
 
Long-term contracts for generation, and the presence in many countries of a 
dominant wholesaler, make competition from imports perhaps more important in 
Eastern Europe than in other parts of the continent, even though interconnection 
capacities are low relative to the size of national markets. However, there is one 
distortion which is quite often seen, and that is for retailing companies to be forced to 
import power in order to compete on the retail market, even when the net flow on the 
inter-connectors is in the other direction. If its position as a net exporter is justified, 
because the country is a low-cost producer, there must be a high margin between 
production costs and retail prices, or the competitive supplier would not find it 
profitable to import power.  An alternative possibility is that the country is exporting, 
perhaps using legacy contracts, despite being a higher-cost producer - neither 
possibility is attractive.  A benchmark for this distortion would be the correlation 
between the net export position of independent retailers in the country, and of the 
country as a whole.  
 
Stronger competition on a regional level might offset the unsatisfactory domestic 
market structures. A regional approach to market design and restructuring would be a 
solution compared to the individual approach taken by most countries. Companies 
that are large on a national basis would be small or at most medium-sized on a 
regional scale. Effective regional markets could offset the limited competition within 
national markets, but require suitable cross-border arrangements. Where these exist, 
as in Nord Pool, it would then be appropriate to calculate benchmarks on a regional 
basis (as is done in parts of this report). If the markets are not truly integrated, 
however, benchmarking on a regional basis would merely make the figures appear 
better, without any change in underlying conditions. 
 
6 Investment and sustainability 
 
The liberalisation of the electricity sector has focused the attention of most 
stakeholders on the short term outcomes of the reform process, assuming that short 
                                                 
5  Most of the transmission lines between countries are frequently congested, particularly those towards 
the importing countries of Austria, Germany and Hungary. 
term efficiency automatically implies the capability of the industry to optimize 
investments in the long run. 
Taking a long term perspective on the sector requires considering the issue of its 
sustainability in environmental, social and economic terms (Perez Arriaga 2004). 
These three dimensions of the electricity sector’s sustainability are directly linked to 
the main targets of any energy policy: efficiency, security of supply and 
environmental impact (De Paoli 2001). In other words, a sustainable energy model 
has been effectively summarised by Perez Arriaga in having adequate capacity, low 
environmental impact, and widespread access to the best technological solutions. 
 
A major issue in the economic literature and in the policy debate concerns the 
effects of the search for sustainability on the competitiveness of industry (Eikeland 
1998). Even if looking for specific benchmarks on the electricity industry, it should be 
considered that a discussion on sustainability cannot be restricted to one industrial 
sector, but necessarily implies a view on the general economic and environmental 
policies of a country. 
 
While evaluations of the environmental performance of the electricity industry are 
relatively common, the economic and social dimensions are far more difficult to 
assess and the related literature is much thinner. In this part of the work some 
indicators related to all of these three dimensions of sustainability are proposed, with 
a few being calculated. 
 
6.1  Social sustainability 
The social dimension of sustainability has several implications that are only 
partially perceived by the consumers, which do not have direct information on the 
national dependence of the economy on foreign energy sources. A focussed effort 
should be done to bring the long term social risks to the attention of European citizens 
and policy makers.  
 
The European Union, after initially pushing the liberalisation of the electricity 
sector with the Directive 96/92/EC, has addressed its policy on longer term targets, 
with the green paper on security of supply issued in 2001 (EU 2001). This document 
started a process of confrontation at EU level that defined new drivers for the future 
energy policy. 
 
The four political challenges that the EU identified in the revision of its policy for 
energy security are the following (EU 2005): 
 
1) managing demand, with the aim to reduce energy consumption wherever possible,  
2) diversifying European sources, enhancing the use of all internal energy sources, 
3) streamlining the internal energy market, with strengthened coordination amongst 
operators even in the liberalised market, 
4) controlling external supply, entering into strategic partnerships with major 
potential suppliers such as Russia and even far-off countries. 
 
Three national indicators that can capture the risks involved in the dependence of 
the sector on imported energy sources are the following: 
 
− Degree of energy independence (%), 
− Degree of diversification of the imported energy sources, 
− Spending on energy research relative to total spending on energy (or spending on 
research per unit of energy used). 
 
The first indicator is rather simple and self explanatory, assuming that domestic 
sources are more reliable than imports.  It is equal to the ratio of energy production in 
the country (including its continental shelf) to its primary energy consumption. 
 
The degree of diversification can capture the effort made by a country to manage 
the risk of dependence from a single energy source and can be calculated as the sum 
of squared quotas of each source, excluding domestic resources not contributing to 
increase the social risk. The lower the indicator, the higher the security of the energy 
sector.  If technical interruptions are the main concern, the index could be calculated 
treating each import route separately – a problem with the pipeline from a country 
would not necessarily prevent liquefied natural gas imports from that country.  If the 
main concern is geopolitical risk, however, then the index should be based upon the 
ultimate source of imports, rather than on transit countries – problems in Russia could 
affect gas supplies from that country, whether they are routed through Belarus or the 
Ukraine. 
 
The third indicator shows the effort made to improve the future conditions of the 
energy sector in relation to the incidence of the cost of electricity. It helps understand 
the readiness of a country to face the challenge of long term sustainability.  A country 
can often use the results of research undertaken abroad, of course, but a strong local 
research base will help it to adopt innovations created elsewhere.  If spillovers are 
strong, however, it might be that the overall level of research within the EU as a 
whole would be the most important variable. 
 
Affordability can be a concern to many electricity consumers.  Fuel poverty is 
defined to occur when a household has to spend more than a set percentage of its net 
income (typically ten per cent) to achieve an acceptable standard of lighting, heating 
and cooking, or lives in a home that cannot be adequately heated.  The proportion of 
households in fuel poverty is an indicator of this aspect of social sustainability, 
although it will reflect both the performance of the electricity industry (in terms of 
average prices, and any special tariffs) and of the economy more generally (in the 
level and distribution of incomes). 
 
From a broader perspective, the lack of universal access to electricity should be 
considered a serious matter of concern within the EU, although basically all of this 
lack of access happens outside European borders. Numerous studies have shown the 
strong relationship between lack of electricity and very low indicators of human 
development. In its energy strategy the EU cannot ignore that almost one third of 
mankind has no access to electricity or other advanced forms of energy, both because 
of solidarity reasons and also because of the many problems derived from the existing 
strong inequalities in human development. An adequate indicator here would be the 
amount of effort that the EU countries devote to international cooperation in energy 
matters.  
 
6.2  Environmental sustainability 
The most familiar aspect of sustainability is related to the effects of electricity 
generation on the environment. Many studies investigated the consequences of 
liberalisation on environmental performance, showing that strict environmental 
regulation is necessary to avoid an excessive focus on competition distracting 
attention from controlling the industry’s environmental impact (e.g. Froggatt, 2000, 
Kemfert 2004, Hertin 2004). Leaving aside the aspect of the companies’ performance, 
which is anyway important, the countries’ policies are considered here. 
 
The investments for sustainability cover a large spectrum of initiatives, ranging 
from research and demonstration of new technologies, to the reduction of pollutant 
emissions, to the support for cleaner energy sources and for energy saving initiatives. 
The evaluation of performance on these areas can be difficult for the lack of 
comparable data among countries, but some indicators for the environmental 
sustainability of the electricity industry can be proposed, concentrating on pollution 
and on the promotion of renewable generation. 
 
− CO2 emissions per kWh generated, 
− expense for research on renewable energy, 
− proportion of generation from renewable sources 
− rate of increase of renewable generation, 
− spending on the promotion of renewable energy, 
 Electricity from conventional sources produces various emissions, of which 
carbon dioxide is currently receiving the most attention.  Carbon dioxide contributes 
to global warming and climate change, and is the subject of reductions under the 
Kyoto Treaty.  The amount of CO2 emissions per kWh generated is a suitable 
benchmark for this pollutant.  (The denominator should include all generation in the 
country, not just conventional stations.)  Other important pollutants, which cause acid 
rain, are sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides.  Once again, the emission per kWh 
generated can be used as a benchmark.  Nuclear generators produce radioactive waste, 
and the weight or volume of this could be benchmarked.  The International Nuclear 
Event Scale, developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear 
Energy Agency of the OECD, is a standardised measure of the severity of operating 
incidents (from anomaly to catastrophic failure) – this could be used to form a 
benchmark on nuclear operating performance.   
 
Renewable energy is taken as benchmark thanks to its long term sustainability and 
security (EEA 2004).  The absolute level of renewable generation may not be a 
suitable benchmark, because countries differ so much in their natural resources.  The 
rate of increase in the share of electricity generation is considered as a sign of the 
country’s commitment.  This will tend to give “late developers” a better score than 
those countries which exploited their resources on a large scale in the past, however.  
An alternative measure would be the amount of renewable generation relative to the 
country’s potential renewable resource.  The problem with this measure is that the 
level of resource is not an absolute figure, for more energy could be produced at a cost 
of €100/MWh than at a cost of €80/MWh, and estimates of the exploitable resource 
may not take other constraints, such as the impact on the local environment, into 
account.  We would not recommend placing too much weight on the measure as an 
indicator of the strength of policy without access to a set of consistent estimates of the 
resource in each country, calculated on a basis that is as objective as possible.   
 
We can also benchmark the effort put into investing in renewable generation, 
measuring both the expenditure on research and development in this area, and the 
overall amount spent on supporting renewable generation.  It is probably most 
appropriate to benchmark this figure per kWh of electricity consumption (from all 
sources) as a measure of the national commitment.  A high figure per kWh of 
renewable generation could imply either that the country was supporting this in a very 
inefficient way, or that it had a very unfavourable environment for renewable power 
production, or that it aims at exporting its technology (it is the case of Denmark).  The 
overall performance of a country emerges clearly from such indicators, covering most 
of the policy aimed at environmental sustainability. 
 
Energy saving has also an environmental value and would deserve attention under 
this perspective, but thanks to its economic profitability will be considered in the 
following section. 
 
6.3  Economic sustainability 
The adequacy of capacity and the capability of the industry to supply electricity at 
competitive prices in the long term are major issues in the evaluation of sustainability. 
A particular emphasis is given to the efficiency in the final uses of electricity. This is 
well captured by the intensity of the electricity use and its trend. The burden related to 
the acquisition of energy sources can be defined by the incidence of the expense for 
importing of energy products on national income. The indicators proposed are thus 
the following: 
 
− electricity intensity and its rate of change 
− Energy imports/GDP 
 With reference to the security of supply in terms of capability of the industry to 
meet the long term demand with proper investments, the reserve margin of electricity 
generation capacity can be a suitable indicator.  This is equal to the total capacity, less 
the peak demand, divided by that demand.  When possible, the peak demand should 
be adjusted to reflect an average year for weather conditions, so that the reserve 
margin used to make comparisons across countries and over time is not depressed by 
an exceptionally severe winter.  Note that a country with a high proportion of 
hydroelectric power will always tend to have a high reserve margin in terms of 
capacity, since the binding constraint on most hydroelectric plants is their reservoir 
size and annual energy production, not hourly energy output.  In the European 
context, some countries may be able to rely on imports from their neighbours, 
although this is obviously not possible for all countries at once (Jamasb and Pollitt, 
2005).   
The average age of the thermal power plants could also affect their thermal 
efficiency (modern plants are more efficient, although new plants often have teething 
problems), while a high average age is a signal that replacement investment will be 
needed soon. The level of capacity, the rate of demand growth, and the ages of the 
existing power stations could be combined in an estimate of the amount of new 
capacity required in the next five or ten years. This would be based on the amount of 
existing capacity that would exceed a specified (and technology-specific) design life, 
adjusted for the effects of demand growth (or reductions). A specified margin of spare 
capacity would be required – if the current margin is greater than this, less new 
investment would be needed. 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
These benchmarks are signals about the performance of the electricity sector in the 
Member States of the European Union. A country may score favourably on some 
benchmarks, despite adopting inappropriate policies, while a country with good 
policies but an unfavourable background environment might score poorly on some 
benchmarks. As always with economic statistics, we need to be careful about 
attributing causation once we have discovered a correlation. Some of our benchmarks 
measure the potential for problems (and that perhaps imperfectly) rather than 
confirming the need for action – a company with a high capacity share within a 
national market may not have market power if it faces strong competition from 
imports, and the existence of a dominant position does not mean that it will actually 
be abused. Having given these warnings, however, a good choice of a range of 
relevant benchmarks can minimise the number of times that a misleading signal is 
sent. 
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 Tables 
 
Table 1: Indicators relevant to market design 
 
Turnover inType of 
unbundlingCountry Market opening Tran Dist
Market 
model 
Balancin
g prices 
set: 
Power 
exchang
Standard 
contracts
Austria 100% leg. leg. Bilateral market 2%  
Belgium c.90% leg. leg. Bilateral regulated - - 
Denmark 100% leg. leg. Hybrid market 34% 340% 
Finland 100% own. acc. Hybrid market 34% 340% 
France 70% leg. Man. Bilateral market 2%  
Germany 100% leg. acc. Bilateral market 8% 69% 
Greece 62% leg. None Bilateral TSO   
Ireland 56% leg. Man. Bilateral reg\mkt - - 
Italy 79% own. leg. Bilateral Reg\TSO 5% 20% 
Luxembourg 57% man. Man. Bilateral    
Netherlands 100% own. leg. Bilateral market 15% n.k. 
Portugal 100% own. acc. Bilateral regulated - 14% 
Spain 100% own. leg. Pool market 99% 2% 
Sweden 100% own leg. Hybrid market 34% 340% 
UK 100% own. leg. Bilateral market 11% 660% 
Norway 100% own. leg.\acc. Hybrid market 34% 340% 
Estonia 10% leg. leg. Bilateral TSO - - 
Latvia 76% HH acc. Bilateral TSO - - 
Lithuania n.k. leg. leg. Bilateral Reg\TSO 19% - 
Poland 52% leg. acc. Bilateral market 1% - 
Czech 
Republic 47% leg. acc. Bilateral market - - 
Slovakia 66% leg. man. Bilateral regulated - - 
Hungary 67% leg. acc. Bilateral regulated - - 
Slovenia 75% leg. acc. Bilateral market 3% - 
Cyprus 35% man. None Bilateral TSO   
Malta 0% n.a. Single buyer n.a. n.a.   
Source: European Commission (2005) 
 
 
Turnover figures are relative to consumption in the country, or the Nord Pool area 
in the case of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. A dash indicates that no figure 
is reported by the Commission, a blank space that the country is not listed in the 
relevant table. 
Table 2: Indicators relevant to market power 
 
Capacity share in 
generation (%)
Customer 
switching in 2003 Country 
Largest Top 3 
Market share 
of top 3 
retailers (%)
Vertical 
integration Large Small 
Austria 45 75 67  7 1 
Belgium 85 95 90  8 19 
Denmark 15 a 40 a 67  22 5 
Finland 15 a 40 a 30  16 4 
France 85 95 88  n.k. N/A 
Germany 30 70 50 50 n.k. n.k. 
Greece 100 = 100  0 N/A 
Ireland 85 90 88  6 1 
Italy 55 75 35  n.k. N/A 
Luxembourg n.a. n.a. 100  n.k. N/A 
Netherlands 25 80 b 88  n.k. n.k. 
Portugal 65 80 99  7 1 
Spain 40 80 85  5 0 
Sweden 15 a 40 a 70  5 10 
UK 20 40 60 50 n.k. 22 
Norway 15 a 40 a 44  15 19 
Estonia 90 100 n.k.  0 N/A 
Latvia 95 100 99  0 N/A 
Lithuania 50 80 100  17 N/A 
Poland 15 35 32 10 7 N/A 
Czech 
Republic 65 75 46  n.k. N/A 
Slovakia 75 85 84  3 n.k. 
Hungary 30 65 56  19 N/A 
Slovenia 70 95 71  10 N/A 
Cyprus 100 = 100  0 N/A 
Malta 100 = 100  0 N/A 
Sources: European Commission (2005) 
 
a Data for Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are for the countries combined.  
b Data are rounded to the nearest 5%, implying that the top 3 generators in The 
Netherlands each have a share very close to 25%, with an average of 26% or 
higher. 
Market share in retailing includes non-eligible customers, except in The 
Netherlands, where the data are for household customers 
Table 3: Some indicators relevant to regulation 
 
Country 
Strength 
of regul 
(Max 5) 
Compet-
encies of 
regulator 
(Max 6) 
Tenure 
of head 
of 
agency 
(years) 
Ease of 
dismissal 
of Head 
Agency 
Financing 
 
Civil 
service 
pay 
Website 
in 
English 
Cost of 
regul 
Austria 4.5 4 4-6 Diff G Yes Yes 0.145 
Belgium 5    P No Yes 0.283 
Denmark 3 5 4-6 Diff P Yes Yes 0.756 
Finland 4 5  Diff   Yes 0.016 
France 4 3 4-6 Diff   Yes 0.086 
Germany 0      Yes N.A. 
Greece 3 4 4-6 Diff   No 0.293 
Ireland 5 6 4-6 Diff P Yes n.a. 0.833 
Italy 4.5 5.5 7+ Diff   Yes 0.102 
Luxembourg 3.5 2 4-6 Diff   No 0.100 
Netherlands 3 5.5  Easy P Yes Yes 0.109 
Portugal 5 4.5 4-6 Diff P No Yes 0.355 
Spain 3 3 4-6 Diff G No Yes 0.102 
Sweden 4 5 4-6 Diff P Yes Yes 0.022 
UK 5 5.5 4-6 Diff P Yes n.a. 0.170 
Norway 5 6 4-6 Diff   Yes 0.016 
Estonia 3      Yes >0.300 
Latvia 5      Yes >1.700 
Lithuania 4    G Yes Yes >0.600 
Poland 4    P Yes Yes 0.140 
Czech 
Republic 5    G Yes Yes 0.253 
Slovakia 4      No 0.375 
Hungary 3    P Yes Yes 0.689 
Slovenia 4      Yes 0.250 
Cyprus 4      No 0.500 
Malta 2      n.a. >>>10 
Sources: 
Strength of regulatory agency on a scale of 1 to 5, 2003 data (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005);  
Competencies of regulator: Full=1, Partial=0.5, None=0 for each of tariffs, network 
access, licensing, terms of delivery, disputes and enforcement, (Larsen et al, 2005); 
Tenure of Head of agency: Range of years, (Larsen et al., 2005); 
Ease of dismissal: Diff=difficult to dismiss on policy grounds; Easy=no specific provisions 
limiting government dismissal (Larsen et al. 2005); 
Agency Funding: G=government, P=private sector, 2000/2001 data (Domah, Pollitt and 
Stern, 2002);  
Civil service pay: 2000/2001 data (Domah, Pollitt and Stern, 2002); 
Website in English accessed 25/08/05 n.a.=English speaking countries;  
Cost of regulation equals Annual Budget 2003 euros divided by size of open market in 
TWh (European Commission, 2004).   
 
Table 4: Indicators relevant to EU Enlargement 
Country Ratio of domestic to industrial prices 
Austria 1.69 
Belgium 1.46 
Denmark 1.30 a
Finland 1.39 
France 1.54 
Germany 1.45 
Greece 0.92 
Ireland 1.20 
Italy 1.65 
Luxembourg 1.89 
Netherlands 0.89 a,b
Portugal 1.67 
Spain 1.37 
Sweden 1.56 
UK 1.61 
Norway  
Estonia 1.23 
Latvia 1.21 
Lithuania 0.99 
Poland 1.18 
Czech Republic 1.32 
Slovakia 1.35 
Hungary 1.01 
Slovenia 1.40 
Cyprus 0.83 a
Malta 0.87 
                Sources:  
The ratio of prices is the average of the ratios, taken in January and July 2004, of the 
Eurostat price for domestic customers (type DC) to the prices for type IB (larger) and type IC 
(smaller) industrial customers. 
a Data are for smaller industrial customers only. In the countries with data for smaller and 
larger customers, the average for smaller customers is 0.95, for larger ones 1.76 
b Data for 2001 
Table 5: Indicators relevant to sustainability 
 
 
Research effort
Country In energy 
($ per tep) 
In RES 
(m €) 
CO2 
emissions  
(g per kWh) 
Increase in 
RES, p.a. 
Proportion of  
RES, % 
Austria 1,029* 12.5 192 2.3% 62.7% 
Belgium 1,074** 12.1 274 5.8% 3.6% 
Denmark 1,301 24.0 336 19.8% 18.9% 
Finland 2,163* 51.6 234 5.6% 23.6% 
France 1,710* 52.6 70 1.5% 12.4% 
Germany 0,872 294.8 508 7.1% 9.5% 
Greece 0,343* 2.5 820 6.7% 10.9% 
Ireland 0,505 0.3 660 4.8% 5.9% 
Italy 1,876 32.7 500 3.3% 18.9% 
Luxembourg  0.3 201 2.0% 27.9% 
Netherlands 2,023* 115.7 439 13.1% 5.5% 
Portugal 0,068 2.0 470 0.4% 39.3% 
Spain 0,396 29.7 404 3.3% 23.5% 
Sweden 2,152 30.1 37 -0.4% 43.9% 
UK 0,231 28.3 458 5.0% 3.5% 
Sources:  
Research effort in energy is spending in the energy sector ($ 2003 per tep 
consumed) (IEA 2004) * = 2002 data, ** = 1999 data  
Research effort in RES is total expenditure for RD&D for RES in each EU country 
in 2001, in millions of 2002 € (EC 2004) 
CO2 emissions in grams per kWh from electricity and heat generation (IEA, 
2004b) 
Increase in RES is the average annual percentage growth rate of renewable 
electricity generation from 1990 to 2002 (IEA, 2004) 
Percentage of generation (gross) from renewable sources is from Eurostat, data for 
2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
